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HO AH KOW v. NUNAN.

a judicial one; and it is before a court which exercises a peculiar
jurisdiction. The proceeding is, as it is technically termed, in rem,
and the general rule, as to the effect and conclusiveness of a judgment, sentence or decree thereupon pronounced, is familiar: Starkie on Evidence *241-8.
A valuable and instructive discussion of the plea of res judicata
as estoppel, and of the replication thereto, is found in Robinson's
Practice, vol. 7, ch. 1, tit. 1, where the leading cases are compared,
criticised and distinguished.
ALEXANDER PORTER MORSE.
Wasbington. D. 0,

RECENT

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Circuit Court of the United State. District of California.
HO AH KOW v. MATTHEW NUNAN.
An ordinance of San Francisco, that every male person imprisoned in the
county jail, under the judgment of any court having jurisdiction in criminal cases
in the city and couutyr, should immediately upon his arrival at the jail, have the
hair of his head "1cut or clipped to an uniform length of one inch from the scalp
thereof," and made it the duty of the sheriff to have this provision enforced, is
invalid, being in excess of the authority of the municipal body, whether the measure be considered as an additional punishment to that imposed by the court upon
conviction under a state law, or as a sanitary regulation, and constituted no justification to the sheriff acting under it.
The ordinance being directed against the Chinese only, imposing upon them a
degrading and cruel punishment, is also subject to the further objection, that it is
forbidden by that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which
declares that no state "shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." This inhibition upon the state applies to all the instrumentalities and agencies employed in the administration of its government; to its
executive, legislative and judicial departments ; and to the subordinate legislative
bodies of its counties and cities.
The equality of protection thus assured to every one whilst within the United
States, implies not only that the courts of the country shall be open to him on the
same terms as to all others for the security of his person or property, the prevention or redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts, but that no charges
or burdens shall be laid upon him which are not equally borne by others, and that
in the administration of criminal justice, he shall suffer for his offences no greater
or different punishment.

THIS was an action brought to recover damages for alleged maltreatment by the defendant, sheriff of San Francisco. The maltreatment consisted in having cut off the queue of the plaintiff, a
queue being worn by all Chinamen, and its deprivation being
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regarded by them as degrading and as entailing future suffering.
Plaintiff was convicted of a misdemeanor, in violating a state
statute "concerning lodging-houses and sleeping-apartments within
the limits of incorporated cities," and sentenced to pay a fine of
ten dollars, or in default of such payment to be imprisoned five
days in the county jail. Failing to pay the fine, he was imprisoned. The defendant, as sheriff of the city and county, had
charge of the jail, and during the imprisonment of the plaintiff
cut off his queue.
Defendant pleaded a justification of his conduct under an ordinance of San Francisco, which declared that every male person
imprisoned in the county jail, under the judgment of any court
having jurisdiction in criminal cases in the city and county, shall
immediately upon his arrival at the jail, have the hair of his head
"cut or clipped to an uniform length of one inch from the scalp
thereof," and made it the duty of the sheriff to have this provision enforced. Under this ordinance the defendant cut off the
queue of the plaintiff. To this plea plaintiff demurred.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FIELD, J.-The validity of the ordinance is denied by the plaintiff on two grounds: 1st. That it exceeds the authority of the
Board of Supervisors, the body in which the legislative power of
the city and county is vested; and, 2d. That it is special legislation imposing a degrading and cruel punishment upon a class of
persons who are entitled, alike with all other persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States, to the equal protection of the
laws. We are of opinion that both these positions are well taken.
The Board of Supervisors is limited in its authority by the act
consolidating the government of the city and county. It can do
nothing unless warrant be found for it there, or in a subsequent
statute of the state. As with all other municipal bodies, its charter-here the Consolidation Act-is the source and measure of its
powers. In looking at this charter, we see that the powers of the
board, and the subjects upon which they are to operate, are all
specified. The board has no general powers, and its special power
to determine the fines, forfeitures and penalties which may be
incurred, is limited to two classes of cases : 1st. Breaches of regulations established by itself; and 2d. Violations of provisions of
the consolidation act, where no penalty is provided by law. It
can impose no penalty in any other case; and when a penalty
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other than that of fine or forfeiture is imposed, it must, by the
terms of the act, be in the form of imprisonment. It can take no
other form. "No penalty to be imposed," is the language used,
"shall exceed the amount of one thousand dollars,, or six months
imprisonment, or both." The mode in' which a penalty can be
inflicted, and the extent of it, are thus limited in defining the
power of the board. In their place nothing else can be substituted.
No one, for example, would pretend that the board could, for any
breach of a municipal regulation or any violation of the consolidation act, declare that a man should be deprived of his right to vote,
or to testify, or to sit on ajury, or that he should be punished with
stripes, or be ducked in a pond, or be paraded through the streets,
or be seated in a pillory, or have his ears cropped, or his head
shaved.
The cutting off the hair of every male person within an inch
of his scalp, on his arrival at the jail, was not intended and cannot
be maintained as s,measure of discipline, or as a sanitary regulation. The act by itself has no tendency to promote discipline,
and can only be a measure of health in exceptional cases. Had
the ordinance contemplated a mere sanitary regulation,.it would
have been limited to such cases and made applicable to females as
well as to males, and to persons awaiting trial as well as to persons
under conviction. The close cutting of the hair which is practised
upon inmates of the state penitentiary, like dressing them in
striped clothing, is partly to distinguish them from others, and
thus prevent their escape, and facilitate their recapture. They
are measures of precaution, as well as parts of a general system
)ftreatment prescribed by the directors of the penitentiary under
the authority of the state, for parties convicted of and imprisoned
for felonies. Nothing of the kind is prescribed or would be tolerated with respect to persons confined in a county jail for simple
misdemeanors, most of which are not of a very grave character.
For the discipline or detention of the plaintiff in this case, who had
the option of paying a fine of ten dollars, or of being imprisoned
for five days, no such clipping of the hair was required. It was
done to add to the severity of his punishment.
But even if the proceeding could be regarded as a measure of
discipline, or as a sanitary regulation, the conclusion would not
help the defendant; for the board of supervisors had no authority
to prescribe the discipline to which persons convicted under the
laws of the state should be subjected, or to determine what special
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sanitary regulations should be enforced with respect to their persons. That is a matter which the legislature had not seen fit to
intrust to the wisdom and judgment of that body. It is to the
board of health of the city and county that a general supervision
of all matters appertaining to the sanitary condition of the county
jail is confided; and only in exceptional cases would the preservation of the health of the institution require the cutting of the hair
of any of its inmates within an inch of his scalp: Act of April
4th 1870; Session Laws of 1869-70, p. .717. The claim, however, put forth that the measure was prescribed as one of health, is
notoriously a mere pretense. A treatment to which disgrace is
attached, and which is not adopted as a means of security against
the escape of the prisoner, but merely to aggravate the severity
of his confinement, can only be regarded as a punishment additional to that fixed by the sentence. If adopted in consequence
of the sentence, it is punishment in addition to that imposed by
the court; if adopted without regard to the sentence, it is wanton
cruelty.
In the present case, the plaintiff was not convicted of any
breach of a municipal regulation, nor of violating any provision
of the consolidation act. The punishment which the supervisors
undertook to add to the fine imposed by the court was without
semblance of authority. The legislature had not conferred upon
them the right to change or add to the punishments which it
deemed sufficient for offences; nor had it bestowed upon them the
right to impose in any case a punishment of the character inflicted
in this case. They could no more direct that the queue of the
plaintiff should be cut off than that the punishments mentioned
should be inflicted. Nor could they order the hair of any one,
Mongolian or other person, to be clipped within an inch of his
scalp. That measure was beyond their power.
The second objection to the ordinance in question is equally
conclusive. It is special legislation, on the part of the supervisors,
against a class of persons, who, under the constitution and laws of
the United States, are entitled to the equal protection of the laws.
The ordinance was intended only for the Chinese in San Francisco. This was avowed by the supervisors on its passage, and
was so understood by every one. The ordinance is known in the
community as the "queue ordinance," being so designated from
its purpose to reach the queues of the Chinese, and it is not
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enforced against any other persons. The reason advanced for its
adoption, and now urged for its continuance, is, that only the
dread of the loss of his queue will induce a Chinaman to pay his
fine. That is to say, in order to enforce the payment of a fine
imposed upon him, it is necessary that torture should be superadded to imprisonment. Then, it is said, the Chinaman will not
accept the alternative, which the law allows, of working out his
fine by his imprisonment, and the state or county will be saved the
expense of keeping him during th imprisonment. Probably the
bastinado, or the knout, or the thumbscrew, or the rack, would
accomplish the same end; and no doubt the Chinaman would prefer either of these modes of torture to that which entails upon him
disgrace among his countrymen, and carries with it the constant
dread of misfortune and suffering after death. It is not creditable
to the humanity and civilization of our people, much less to their
Christianity, that an ordinance of this character was possible.
The.class character of this legislation is none the less manifest,
because of the general terms in which it is expressed. The statements of supervisors, in debate on the passage of the ordinance,
cannot, it is true, be resorted to for the purpose of explaining the
meaning of the terms used; but they can be resorted to for the
purpose of ascertaining the general object of the legislation proposed, and the mischiefs sought to be remedied. Besides, we cannot shut our eyes to matters of public notoriety and general cognisance. When we take our seats on the bench, we are not struck
with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges what we see as
men; and where an ordinance, though general in its terms, only
operates upon a special race, sect or class, it being universally
understood that it is to be enforced only against that race, sect or
class, we may justly conclude that it was the intention of the body
adopting it that it should only have such operation, and treat it
accordingly. We may take notice of the limitation given to the
general terms of an ordinance by its practical construction as a
fact in its history, as we do in some cases that a law has practically
become obsolete. If this were not so, the most important provisions of the constitution, intended for the security of personal
rights, would, by the general terms of an enactment, often be
evaded and practically annulled: Brown v. Piper, 1 Otto 42;
Ohio Loan and Trust Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 485. The complaint in this case shows that the ordinance acts with special
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severity upon Chinese prisoners, inflicting upon them suffering
altogether disproportionate to what would be endured by other
prisoners, if enforced against them. Upon the Chinese prisoners
its enforcement operates as "a cruel and unusual punishment."
Many illustrations might be given. where ordinances, general in
their terms, would operate only upon a special class, or upon a
class, with exceptional severity, and thus incur the odium and be
subject to the legal objection of intended hostile legislation against
them. We have, for instance, in our community a large number
of Jews. They are a highly intellectual race, and are generally
obedient to the laws of the country. But, as is well known, they
have peculiar opinions with respect to the use of certain articles of
food, which they cannot be forced to disregard without extreme
pain and suffering. They look, for example, upon the eating of
pork with loathing. It is an offence against their religion, and is
associated in their minds with uncleanness and impurity. Now,
if they should, in some quarter of the city, overcrowd their dwellings, and thus become amenable, like the Chinese, to the act concerning lodging-houses and sleeping-apartments, an ordinance of
the supervisors, requiring that all prisoners confined in the county
jail should be fed on pork, would be seen by every one to be
levelled at them; and, notwithstanding its general terms, would
be regarded as a special law in its purpose and operation.
During various periods of English history, legislation, general
in its character, has often been enacted with the avowed purpose
of imposing special burdens and restrictions upon Catholics; but
that legislation has since been regarded as not less odious and
obnoxious to animadversion than if the persons at whom it was
aimed had been particularly designated.
But, in our country, hostile and discriminating legislation by a
state against persons of any class, sect,-creed or nation, in whatever form it may be expressed, is forbidden by the fourteenth
amendment of the constitution. That amendment, in its first section, declares who are citizens of the United States, and then
enacts that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge their privileges and immunities. It further declares that
no state shall deprive any person (dropping the distinctive term
citizen) of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor
deny to any person the equal protection of the laws. This inhibition upon the state applies to all the instrumentalities and agenVOL. XXVIL-86
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cies employed in the administration of its government; to its
executive, legislative and judicial departments; and to the subordinate legislative bodies of counties and cities. And the equality
of protection thus assured to every one, whilst within the United
States, from whatever country he may have come, or of whatever
race or color he may be, implies not only that the courts of the
country shall be open to him on the same terms as to all others,
for the security of his person or property, the prevention or redress
of wrongs and the enforcement of contracts, but that no charges or
burdens shall be laid upon him which are not equally borne by
others, and that, in the administration of criminal justice, he shall
suffer for his offences no greater or different punishment.
Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, Congress has
legislated for the purpose of carrying out its provisions in accordance with these views. The Revised Statutes re-enacting provisions of law passed in 1870, declare that "all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every state and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to-like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions of every kind, and
to no other." (See. 1977.) They also declare, that "every person
who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any state or territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected.
any citizen of the United States, or other person within the jurisdiction thereof, to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress." (Sec. 1979.)
It is certainly something in which a citizen of the United States
may feel a generous pride that the government of his country
extends protection to all persons within its jurisdiction; and that
every blow aimed at any of them, however humble, come from what
quarter it may, is "caught upon the broad shield of our blessed
constitution and our equal laws." (Judge BLACK'S argument in
the Fos8at case, 2 Wall. 703.)

We are aware of the general feeling-amounting to positive
hostility-prevailing in California against the Chinese, which
would prevent their further immigration hither, and expel from the
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state those already here. Their dissimilarity in physical characteristics, in language, manners and religion would seem, from
past experience, to prevent the possibility of their assimilation with
our people. And thoughtful persons, looking at the millions which
crowd the opposite shores of the Pacific, and the possibility at no
distant day of their pouring over in vast hordes among us, giving
rise to fierce antagonisms of race, hope that some way may be
devised to prevent their further immigration. We feel the force
and importance of these considerations; but the remedy for the
apprehended evil is to be sought from the general government,
where, except in certain special cases, all power over the subject
lies. To that government belongs exclusively the treaty-making
power, and the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
which includes intercourse as well as traffic, and, with the exceptions presently mentioned, the power to prescribe the conditions
of immigration or importation of persons. The state in these
particulars, with those exceptions, is powerless, and nothing is
gained by the attempted assertion of a control which can never be
admitted. The state may exclude from its limits paupers and
convicts of other countries, persons incurably diseased, and others
likely to become a burden upon its resources. It may, perhaps,
also exclude persons whose presence would be dangerous to its
established institutions. But there its power ends. Whatever is
done by way of exclusion beyond this must come from the general
government. That government alone can determine what aliens
shall be permitted to land within the United States, and upon what
conditions they shall be permitted to remain; whether they shall
be restricted in business transactions to such as appertain to foreign
commerce, as is practically the case with our people in China, or
whether they shall be allowed to engage in all pursuits equally
with citizens. For restrictions necessary or desirable in these
matters, the appeal must be made to the general government; and
it is not believed that the appeal will ultimately be disregarded.
Be that as it may, nothing can be accomplished in that direction
by hostile and spiteful legislation on the part of the state, or of its
municipal bodies, like the ordinance in question-legislation which
is unworthy of a brave and manly people. Against such legislation it will always be the duty of the judiciary to declare and
enforce the paramount law of the nation.
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The plaintiff must have judgment on the demurrer to the de.
fendant's plea of justification; and it is -so ordered.
SAWYER,

Circuit Judge, concurred.

The learned judge, who delivered
the foregoing opinion, had two questions to deal with of no little difficulty
and delicacy. The first relates to the
power of the legislature to accomplish
by indirect means that which it could
not avow in its action and accomplish
directly. The second is, what does the
constitution forbid as unequal and class
legislation ?
It is matter of every-day observation
that legislatures are accustomed to
treat constitutional limitations as imposing no moral obligation whatever
upon their members. If, therefore,
their desires lead them to evade or
break over the limitations, and they
can do so without encountering direct
and positive prohibitions, they do not
hesitate to do so, and they violate the
spirit of the law without scruple, while
they keep within a strict construction
of its words. Sometimes this may be
done with impunity, because it is done
under a pretence of something lawful,
which no one is at liberty to disprove
or dispute ; as Congress prohibited the
circulation of state bank-notes, while
pretending merely to provide for the
collection of a revenue from them :
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533.
But where the purpose is apparent in
the legislation itself, construed in the
light of'such facts as the court may
notice judicially, so that extrinsic evidence is not necessary to unfold it,
there is no reason why the judiciary
should hesitate to stamp as unconstitutional the indirect and circuitous evasion of the fundamental law, any more
than it should a violation that is direct
and avowed.
Some of the cases in which legislasures have attempted to avoid the prohi-

bition of special legislation, by passing
laws general in form, but applicable to
single cases only, are instructive. It
is known that many of the states have
gone a great ways in requiring general
legislation wherever it could he made
applicable, and in forbidding special
acts in many cases. These provisions
are often found to run counter to the
desires of legislators, and they are then
evaded, if evasion is found to be practicable. Thus, a legislature forbidden
to grant divorces, may undertake to
empower a court to do so in a particular and exceptional case : Teft v. Tot,
3 Mich. 67 ; Simonds v. Simonds, 103
Mass. 572. Or, having no power to
impose a pecuniary obligation upon a
municipality, may attempt to do so
indirectly, by giving validity and force
to the unauthorized action of individuals : Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis.
37; Marshall v. Silliman, 61 I1. 218.
See Williams v. Bidleman, 7 Nev. 68 ;
People v. Supervisor, 4-c., 16 Mich. 254.
Or, being prohibited from passing incorporation acts, may attempt to so
remodel and extend the corporate powers of an existing corporation as in
effect to create a new corporation :
San Francisco v. Spring Valley Waterworks, 48 Cal. 493.
Many such illustrations might be
given, but the principle which underlies them all is the same. The case
of Devine v. Commissioners of Cook Co.,
84 Ill. 590, is particularly instructive.
It was there held, that designating
counties as a class, according to a minimum population, which makes it absolutely certain hut one county in the
state can avail itself of the benefits of a
law applicable to such class, is nothing
but a device to evade the constitutional
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and is void for that reason. Compare
Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio (N. S.) 85,
and Kiigore v. Magee, 85 Penn. St.
401, which seem to be contra, but are
distinguishable.
If, therefore, the legislation condemned in the principal case was calculated
and designed to be offensive to, and
inflict pain upon, people of one nationality only, and would have been void if
in terms restricted in its application to
that people, the general terms in which
it is couched ought not to save it from
condemnation.
The existence of a particular evil,
however, is sometimes the occasion for
passing a general law; and the fact
that but a single case is likely to come
under it, cannot affect the power of the
legislature to pass it, where the law in
good faith is made general in its scope.
There exists, for example, in the state
of New York a communistic society,
which is understood to hold and put in
practice doctrines on the subject of sexual intercourse between its unmarried
members, which are of vicious example
and abhorrent to the moral sense of the
people of the state ; and it would be a
singular and certainly a futile objection
to a general law for the punishment
of their practices, that because the
practices did not exist outside of their
society, therefore the law was partial
and oppressive. The validity of a
penal law can never be tested by the
number who disregard it; on the contrary, the fact that nearly everybody
abstains from the forbidden conduct is
generally very good evidence that it
ought to be forbidden.
But there is and can be no authority
in the state to punish as criminal such
practices or fashions as are indifferent
in themselves, and the observance of
which does not prejudice the community or interfere with the proper liberty
of any of its members. No better
ilustration of one's rightful liberty in

this regard can be given than the fashion of wearing the hair. If the wearing of a queue can be made unlawful,
so may be the wearing of curls by a
lady, or of a mustache by a beau, and
the state may, at its discretion, fix a
standard of hair-dressing to which all
shall conform. The conclusive answer
to any such legislation is, that it meddles with that which is no concern
of the state, and therefore invades private right. The state might, with even
more color of reason, regulate the
tables of its citizens, than their methods of wearing their hair ; for the first
might do something towards establishing temperance in eating, while the
other would be simply absurd and
ridiculous.
But if the state cannot regulate the
fashions of the hair of those outside the
prisons, what right can it have to regulate them for persons in confinement
under its laws ? In other words, what
is there in the fact, that one is undergoing confinement for a breach of the
penal laws that can enlarge the authority of the state in this regard ?
The common impression that a prisoner under sentence is pretty much at
the arbitrary disposal of his keeper, is
not only exceedingly erroneous, but it
is one that leads to many abuses. Tue
principle that limits his power, we suppose to be clear enough : he may do
whatever is necessary to give complete
effect to the sentence of the law, but he
cannot go a step further, because the
prisoner is confided to him for that
purpose, and for no other. He may,
therefore, subject him to the restraint
of irons, if necessary to his detention ;
he may compel him to submit to sanitary regulations essential to health ; he
may force him to work, if such is the
sentence; he may require him to wear
the prison uniform, not only. because
of its convenience, but because of its
utility in preventing escapes ; and he
may compel the observance of other
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regulations, which have the general
purpose of the sentence in view, and
are not purely arbitrary. But if female
prisoners were subjected to regulations
shocking to the modesty of a virtuous
woman, or male prisoners to those of
an inleeent nature, there should be no
difficulty in holding that their rights
were violated. Convicts have all the
rights of other citizens, except as these
are limited by the sentence of the law
and proceedings for its proper execution.
If the cutting off of the queue could
be defended as a sanitary regulation, or
as being needful and proper to prevent
escapes, or as removing something that
interfered with the performance of the
convict's labor, when labor is a part
of his punishment, there would be a
show of reason for saying that the regulation came within the implied powers
of the prison authorities. But nothing
of this sort can be pretended. The
wearing of the hair in this way is no
more unhealthy than female fashions
of the hair in general, and the convict
can be kept as well and can work as
well with it on as with it off. The regulation for the cutting off of the queue
is, therefore, a regulation not important to the preservation of discipline in
the prison, or to the due enforcement
of the sentence to imprisonment, and is
therefore illegitimate and illegal.
The avowed reason for establishing
this regulation was that the dread of its
enforcement would compel obedience to

the law by persons who feared neither
the fines nor the imprisonment which
the law imposed. Nothing more plainly
than this avowal could show that the
learned judge was right in holding that
the regulation imposed a punishment.
It could not have done so more distinctly had it provided that every day
the convict remained in prison, he
might be subjected to the discipline of
the whip. No doubt this might have
deterred some persons from the commission of crime, but it would not for
that reason become legal. Punishments are limited by the sentence ot
the law, and whatever is imposed beyond that is illegal, irrespective of its
tendency. Moreover, the law itself is
limited in respect to the punishments
for which it may provide. The constitution prohibits those of a cruel and
unusual nature, but the requirement
of equal protection of the laws to all
persons is also prohibitory. When the
law imposes a punishment which only
a certain class of persons, because
of peculiar but innocent habits, sentiments or beliefs, can feel, and imposes
it for the avowed purpose of affecting
this class as others are not affected, it
seems plain that not only is the equal
protection of the laws denied to the
class, but that they are directly and
purposely subjected to pains and penalties which others, of different habits,
sentiments or beliefs, are never expected to feel.
T. M. C.

SuPreme Court of Indiana.
.BOWEN

ET AL.

V. SULLIVAN.

The finder of lost property has a title to it superior to that of any other person
except the loser or real owner. The place of finding makes no difference in this
rule.
An employee in a paper factory, whilst engaged in assorting a bale of old papers
purchased by the proprietor for manufacture, found certain lost, genuine bank
hills enclosed in a clean, unmarked and undirected envelone, which formed part

